Flip-flopping and Electoral Concerns - R&R, The Journal of Politics (pdf)

Policy-making in changing environments requires policy revisions. At the same

time, however, the action record of a politician contains information about his

competence that can create a reputation premium for consistent decision-making.

As a result, politicians with high reputation concerns are deterred from updating their policies in light of new information, decreasing both the quality of the decisions taken and the ability of voters to select competent politicians. My model thus provides a rationale for the stigma often associated with policy shifts (flip-flopping) and increases our understanding of the factors shaping the degree to which inconsistent policy-making is punished by voters. In addition to this, the model has implications concerning several important issues, such as the behavior of term-limited politicians, the timing of policy shifts and the types of tasks to assign to a reputation concerned agent.

Signaling Valence in Primary Elections - R&R, Games and Economic Behavior (pdf)

I build a model of two-stage (primary and general) elections in which primary election candidates differ in terms of a privately observed quality dimension (valence).
I show that primary election candidates have the incentive to signal their valence
by means of their policy platform choice. There can be two types of separating equilibria in primary elections: an extremist equilibrium, in which valent candidates choose more extreme policies than non-valent ones, and a centrist one, in which valent candidates instead move close to the incumbent from the opposing party. The ideology of primary elections voters is the main driver of the choice of one versus the other separating strategy. I also study the conditions under which party voters benefit from primaries, as well as those under which primaries increase the probability for a party of winning the general election. Finally, I assess the effects of incumbency advantage/disadvantage, explore alternative patterns of valence observability and extend the model to account for both parties holding primaries.

Scandals, Media Competition and Political Accountability - with Antoni-Italo de Moragas (CUNEF) (New Draft Coming Soon!)

We present a model of a media market in which a set of news outlets compete to break a news. In our model, each media receives some information on whether a politician in office is corrupt. Media outlets can decide whether to break the story immediately or wait and fact-check, taking into account that if another media breaks the news, the profit opportunity disappears. We show that as the number of competitors increases, each outlet becomes more likely to break the news without fact-checking.Therefore, as the number of media increases, the incumbent politician is more likely
to be accused of corruption by the media: this makes the re-election of incumbents
more difficult and increases political turnover. In particular, we show that if voters
consult with higher priority the media outlets that report about a scandal, increasing
the number of competitors decreases the probability of having an honest politician in


Polarization and Reform (with Chris Li)
Experts and Political Accountability (with Antoni-Italo De Moragas and Philipp Denter)
Interrogation Methods (with Federico Vaccari)

Giovanni Andreottola,
Jul 17, 2020, 4:51 AM
Giovanni Andreottola,
Jul 17, 2020, 4:50 AM